Macroprudential Rules and Monetary Policy when Financial Frictions Matter by Jeannine Bailliu et al.
 
Working Paper/Document de travail 
2012-6 
Macroprudential Rules and Monetary 
Policy when Financial Frictions Matter 
by Jeannine Bailliu, Césaire Meh and Yahong Zhang 
 
   2
Bank of Canada Working Paper 2012-6 
February 2012 
Macroprudential Rules and Monetary 




2 and Yahong Zhang
2 
  1International Economic Analysis Department 
Bank of Canada 
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1A 0G9 
jbailliu@bankofcanada.ca 
 
2Canadian Economic Analysis Department 
Bank of Canada 
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1A 0G9 
cmeh@bankofcanada.ca 
yzhang@bankofcanada.ca 
Bank of Canada working papers are theoretical or empirical works-in-progress on subjects in 
economics and finance. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors. 
No responsibility for them should be attributed to the Bank of Canada. 
 
ISSN 1701-9397  © 2012 Bank of Canada  
   ii
Acknowledgements 
We have benefited from comments from Robert Amano, Gino Cateau, and from seminar 
participants at the Bank of Canada and the Annual Meetings of the Canadian Economics 
Association. We also thank Jill Ainsworth for her research assistance. This paper was 
previously circulated under the title: Monetary Policy and Macroprudential Rules: Should 
Central Banks Respond to Signs of Emerging Financial Imbalances?   iii
Abstract 
This paper examines the interaction between monetary policy and macroprudential policy 
and whether policy makers should respond to financial imbalances. To address this issue, 
we build a dynamic general equilibrium model that features financial market frictions and 
financial shocks as well as standard macroeconomic shocks. We estimate the model using 
Canadian data. Based on these estimates, we show that it is beneficial to react to financial 
imbalances. The size of these benefits depends on the nature of the shock where the 
benefits are larger in the presence of financial shocks that have broader effects on the 
macroeconomy. 
JEL classification: E42, E50, E60 
Bank classification: Monetary policy framework; Financial stability; Financial markets; 
Economic models 
Résumé 
Les auteurs examinent les interactions entre la politique monétaire et la politique 
macroprudentielle ainsi que la question de savoir si les autorités doivent réagir aux 
déséquilibres financiers. Pour ce faire, ils construisent un modèle d’équilibre général 
dynamique où les marchés financiers sont soumis à des frictions et qui englobe des chocs 
tant financiers que macroéconomiques. Le modèle est estimé au moyen de données 
canadiennes. Les estimations effectuées montrent qu’il est avantageux de réagir aux 
déséquilibres financiers. L’ampleur des avantages retirés dépend de la nature du choc : le 
gain de bien être est plus important lorsque le choc financier a des effets étendus dans 
l’économie. 
Classification JEL : E42, E50, E60 
Classification de la Banque : Cadre de la politique monétaire; Stabilité financière; 
Marchés financiers; Modèles économiques 
 
 1 Introduction
The recent ﬁnancial crisis has revived interest in a long-standing question in monetary eco-
nomics: should the goal of monetary policy be extended beyond price stability? As the events
of the past few years have made clear, near-term price stability is sometimes not suﬃcient to
ensure macroeconomic stability. Indeed, most of the advanced economies experienced severe
recessions in 2008-2009 even though they all had been pursuing monetary policies focused on
price stability for many years. This experience has given fresh signiﬁcance to an old question:
in addition to pursuing the objective of price stability, should central banks also respond
to ﬁnancial imbalances, such as those associated with unsustainable credit expansion and
asset-price bubbles?
This paper addresses this question by comparing the performance of a set of policy regimes
centered on price stability to another set where policy-makers also respond to emerging ﬁnan-
cial imbalances, in the context of a standard sticky-price dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium (DSGE) model that includes ﬁnancial market imperfections and a ﬁnancial shock. The
diﬀerent regimes are ranked using a welfare criterion. Our model-based analysis enables us to
examine whether a policy regime that also addresses ﬁnancial imbalances – characterized as
a signiﬁcant and sustained deviation of asset prices or ﬁnancial indicators from longer-term
trends – can be optimal from a welfare perspective and whether there are trade-oﬀs (com-
pared to a standard Taylor rule) to using monetary policy rules that lean against the build-up
of ﬁnancial imbalances or to using monetary policy rules complemented by macroprudential
rules.
We follow FSB-BIS-IMF (2011) in deﬁning macroprudential policy as a policy that uses
primarily prudential tools to limit systemic ﬁnancial risk and hence prevent disruption to key
ﬁnancial services in the economy. In our model, use of the macroprudential tool is triggered
by signs of emerging ﬁnancial imbalances and is assumed to have a direct inﬂuence on the
funding costs of ﬁrms (via the external ﬁnance premium). For example, a period of excessive
credit expansion would trigger use of the macroprudential tool, leading to an increase in ﬁrms’
funding costs and a dampening of investment (and hence aggregate economic activity). This
mechanism is intended to capture the eﬀects of macroprudential tools such as loan-to-value
ratios or the countercyclical capital buﬀer, a key measure in the recently-approved Basel III
package.1
Our ﬁndings suggest that welfare is higher, compared to a standard Taylor rule, in regimes
where policy-makers respond to ﬁnancial imbalances using the policy rate and/or the macro-
prudential tool. The welfare gain arises due to the beneﬁts that such regimes oﬀer for macroe-
conomic stabilization, particularly in the presence of ﬁnancial shocks. Although the perfor-
1See Carney (2011) for a discussion of countercyclical capital buﬀers as envisioned in Basel III.
1mance of the diﬀerent regimes varies depending on the types of shocks that buﬀet the economy,
our results suggest that the beneﬁts of responding to ﬁnancial imbalances in the presence of
all shocks outweigh the costs.
Several recent papers suggest, in the context of DSGE models with ﬁnancial frictions, that
there may be gains from including ﬁnancial and credit conditions in monetary policy rules.
In their study of optimal Taylor-type interest rate rules, Faia and Monacelli (2007) ﬁnd that
monetary policy should respond to increases in asset prices. However, they ﬁnd that when
monetary policy reacts strongly to inﬂation, the marginal welfare gain of responding to asset
prices vanishes. In a model with frictions in the wage-setting process, Christiano et al. (2007)
show that a monetary policy rule that focuses too narrowly on inﬂation may inadvertently
contribute to welfare-reducing boom-bust cycles and that including credit growth into the
standard Taylor rule brings the model response to shocks more closely in line with the eﬃcient
response. Curdia and Woodford (2010) focus on credit spreads and ﬁnd that including interest
rate spreads can improve upon the standard Taylor rule.
Our paper is more similar to the work of Kannan et al. (2009), Angelini et al. (2011)
and Christensen et al. (2011) in that it considers the potential gains from complementing
monetary policy rules with macroprudential rules. In Kannan et al. (2009), the authors
modify a standard New Keynesian model to create a special role for the housing market
and compare the behaviour of their model economy under diﬀerent policy regimes, assuming
that policy-makers have two instruments at their disposal: a nominal short-term interest rate
and a macroprudential instrument. Policy regimes are ranked in terms of the evenly weighted
variances of the output gap and inﬂation. They calibrate their model and ﬁnd that the regime
that includes a credit term in the monetary policy reaction function and a macroprudential
rule can improve macroeconomic stability in the face of a ﬁnancial shock but not in the
presence of a productivity shock. Angelini et al. (2011) reach a similar conclusion in their
study, which uses a DSGE model developed by Gerali et al. (2010) featuring an imperfectly-
competitive banking sector and estimated on euro area data: the beneﬁts of introducing
macroprudential policy (relative to a ”monetary-policy-only world”) are modest when the
economic cycle is driven by supply shocks but sizeable when ﬁnancial or housing market
shocks are important drivers of the macroeconomy. Moreover, Angelini et al. (2011) ﬁnd
that in all cases, cooperation between the central bank and the macroprudential authority
yields superior outcomes. Christensen et al. (2011) focus mainly on the interaction between
monetary policy and countercyclical capital buﬀers. In contrast to our work, their paper
features endogenous banking sector riskiness. Our paper diﬀers from these three studies in
two key respects. First, we opt to estimate the main structural parameters of our model
using Canadian data. Based on these estimates, we conduct simulations under the diﬀerent
2regimes and rank them using a welfare criterion instead of an ad hoc loss function.2 Second,
we consider a broader set of monetary policy regimes, including both inﬂation and price-
level targeting. Boivin et al. (2010) also argue that the appropriate response of monetary
policy to ﬁnancial imbalances depends on the nature of the imbalances as well as on the
alternative policy instruments available. In particular, they contend that monetary policy
may be eﬀective in countering a ﬁnancial imbalance if such an imbalance has a material
aggregate impact and/or suitable macroprudential policy instruments are not available.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we brieﬂy review the literature
linking monetary policy and emerging ﬁnancial imbalances. In Section 2, we present the DSGE
model the we use to examine whether a policy regime that also addresses ﬁnancial imbalances
can be optimal. In Section 3, we discuss the data and estimation strategy employed. In Section
4, we present the estimation results and discuss the performance of the estimated model. In
Section 5, we use the estimated model to analyze the performance of the diﬀerent policy
regimes considered in reaction to key shocks. In Section 6, we compare the performance
of the diﬀerent policy regimes using a welfare criterion. Section 7 oﬀers some concluding
remarks.
2 The Model
To examine whether policy-makers should respond to emerging ﬁnancial imbalances, we use
a standard sticky-price dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model that includes
ﬁnancial market imperfections and a ﬁnancial shock. In this model, ﬁnancial and credit
conditions play a central role in the propagation of cyclical ﬂuctuations due to a ﬁnancial
accelerator eﬀect. As the ﬁnancial crisis has underscored, there are signiﬁcant feedback eﬀects
from ﬁnancial and credit conditions to the real economy and it is important for standard
macroeconomic models to captures these eﬀects.3 We model ﬁnancial frictions following
Bernanke et al. (1999) except that debt contracts are assumed to be written in nominal
terms.4 In this set-up, there is an inverse link between the external ﬁnance premium and
2In Angelini et al. (2011), the central bank and the macroprudential authority each seek to minimize their
respective loss function. The loss function for the central bank includes the variance of inﬂation and output
growth whereas that of the macroprudential authority is based on the variance of the loans-to-output ratio.
Christensen et al. (2011) also use a welfare criterion, however, their welfare comparison is based on a calibrated
version of their model.
3Indeed, estimated models that incorporate a ﬁnancial accelerator have been found to have a better em-
pirical ﬁt than models without this mechanism. See, for example, Christensen and Dib (2008) who estimate
a sticky-price DSGE model with a ﬁnancial accelerator using U.S. data and ﬁnd that their model is better
able to account for the key features of the U.S. data than the same model without a ﬁnancial accelerator
mechanism. Covas and Zhang (2010) estimate a sticky-price DSGE model that includes debt and equity
market frictions using Canadian data and ﬁnd a similar result.
4Other studies have also made this assumption. For examples, Christiano et al. (2003),Gilchrist and Saito
(2006), Christensen and Dib (2008) and Covas and Zhang (2010).
3ﬁrms’ net worth. The ﬁnancial shock is assumed to inﬂuence the funding costs of ﬁrms
(and hence investment and aggregate economic activity) via its eﬀect on the external ﬁnance
premium.
This model economy is populated by three types of agents: households, entrepreneurs,
and retailers. The entrepreneurs produce intermediate goods and face ﬁnancial frictions.
Final goods can be used either for consumption or as capital in production. Retailers bundle
together intermediate goods and transform them into ﬁnal goods – the introduction of retailers
allows for the presence of price rigidities.
2.1 Households
The household’s problem is fairly standard. The representative household maximizes its






























where Ct is consumption; 1   Ht is leisure, with 0 < H < 1; 1/γ is the elasticity of labour
supply; and θ is the weight on leisure in the utility function. The household supplies labour
to the entrepreneurs and receive the nominal wage, Wt, in return and owns equity in the
retailers receiving the real dividend, Πt. The household saves by holding a one-period riskless
bond Bt; and Rn
t 1 is the nominal rate of return on the riskless bond held between periods
t   1 and t.
The variable et is an exogenous preference shock, which follows





























where Pt is the aggregate price level.
2.2 Entrepreneurs

















t is the capital purchased by entrepreneur j in period t-1; and L
j
t is the labour hired
by entrepreneur j. The production of the intermediate good is subject to two types of shocks:
ωt and zt. The former is an idiosyncratic shock, known only to the entrepreneur.5 The latter
shock is an exogenous technology shock common to all the entrepreneurs, which follows








































where Wt and W e
t are the nominal wages received by households and entrepreneurs, respec-
tively, and PW,t is the nominal price of the intermediate good.
Capital purchased at the end of period t, K
j
t+1, is partly ﬁnanced from the entrepreneur’s
net worth, N
j













5The idiosyncratic shock is assumed to be i.i.d. across entrepreneurs and time and to have mean E[ω
j
t] = 1.
5where Qt is the price of capital relative to the aggregate price Pt.
A ﬁnancial market imperfection arises due to asymmetric information between the bor-
rower and the lender – the idiosyncratic shock is private information for the entrepreneur and
is not observed by the lender. The lender has to pay an auditing cost to observe the output.
With costly monitoring, the optimal debt contract that gives rise to a risk premium associated
with external funds is one in which monitoring only takes place in the case of default. The
risk premium associated with external funds, s(.), is deﬁned as the ratio of the entrepreneur’s












t+1 is the expected rate of return of capital, which is equal to the expected cost
of external funds in equilibrium, and Et[Rn
t
Pt
Pt+1] is the cost of internal funds. The optimal
contract implies that the external ﬁnance premium, s(.), increases with leverage (i.e., depends
on the entrepreneur’s balance sheet position), and thus can be characterized at the aggregate








′(.) > 0, s(1) = 1 and ft is an exogenous ﬁnancial shock common to all the en-
trepreneurs, which follows







The supply curve for external ﬁnancing or the expected marginal cost of external ﬁnancing











The expected gross return on capital from periods t to t+1, EtRk
t+1, depends on the marginal










The demand for capital depends on both the expected return on capital (equation (17))
6and the expected cost of external ﬁnancing (equation (16)). Entrepreneurs are assumed to
have ﬁnite lives to ensure that they will never accumulate enough funds to ﬁnance capital
acquisitions entirely out of net worth. The probability that an entrepreneur survives until the
next period is η.
The aggregate net worth of entrepreneurs at the end of period t, Nt+1, is the sum of equity














Equation (18) suggests that the diﬀerence between the realized rate of return on capital in
period t, Rk
t, and the expected rate of return on capital in the previous period, Et 1Rk
t, is
the main source of change in entrepreneurial net worth. Since the debt contract speciﬁes a
nominal interest rate, an unanticipated change in inﬂation will also aﬀect the real cost of debt
repayment, and, in turn, the diﬀerence between Rk
t and Et 1Rk
t. Substituting equation (16)



















which implies that an unexpected increase (decrease) in inﬂation reduces (increases) the real
cost of debt repayment and, in turn, increases (decreases) net worth.
Entrepreneurs going out of business will consume their residual equity,
C
e










t is the aggregate consumption of the entrepreneurs who exit in period t.
2.3 Capital producers
Final goods can be used either for consumption or as capital in production, although there are




Kt   δ)2Kt). The aggregate capital stock evolves according to
Kt+1 = xtIt + (1   δ)Kt (21)
where K is the capital stock, It are investment goods purchased from retailers, xtIt are eﬃcient
investment goods and xt is an investment-speciﬁc shock that follows the following ﬁrst-order
7autoregressive process:























yielding the following ﬁrst-order condition
Et
[








There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers of measure 1 indexed by j who
buy intermediate goods from entrepreneurs and diﬀerentiate them at no cost. Each retailer j




























Each retailer can reoptimize its price only once it receives a random signal, following Calvo
(1983). The probability of receiving such a signal is 1   ν. Thus, in each period, a fraction
1 ν of retailers reset their prices, while the remaining retailers keep their prices ﬁxed. Each
retailer selects its price in order to maximize its expected real total proﬁt over the periods











8where ∆t,i  βiCt+i/Ct is the stochastic discount factor and the real marginal cost, mct, is
the price of the intermediate good relative to the price of the ﬁnal good (PW,t/Pt). Let P 
t be















and the aggregate price level evolves according to:
Pt = [νP
1 ε











1 α = Ct + C
e









In this model, price stickiness induces price dispersion across ﬁnal goods, and this price
dispersion is ineﬃcient and causes output loss. Thus, when aggregating, some adjustment
needs to be made to take this ineﬃciency into account. To illustrate this point, consider the
equilibrium condition at the ﬁrm level:
F(Kjt,Ljt) = (Ct + C
e














Integrating over all ﬁrms yields the following:
F(Kt,Lt) = (Ct + C
e























dj. It can be shown that the following holds:








Thus, the resource constraint in the model is given by
F(Kt,Lt) = (Ct + C
e









6See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006) for details.
9where Γt summarizes the resource costs induced by the relative price dispersion.7
2.6 Monetary policy and macroprudential rules
We compare the behaviour of our model economy under four diﬀerent monetary policy /macro-
prudential regimes. Our baseline policy regime is a standard Taylor rule with interest-rate
smoothing (standard Taylor rule). The second policy regime is an augmented Taylor rule in
which the baseline policy rule is augmented to allow the policy interest rate to also react to
changes in nominal credit (augmented Taylor rule); or in other words, the central bank can
also use the policy rate to lean against the build-up of emerging ﬁnancial imbalances. The
third regime combines a macroprudential rule with a standard Taylor rule (macroprudential
regime with a standard Taylor rule), and the fourth regime combines a macroprudential in-
strument with the augmented Taylor rule (macroprudential regime with an augmented Taylor
rule).
2.6.1 Standard Taylor rule
Our baseline policy regime is a standard Taylor rule with interest-rate smoothing, a standard
way to characterize monetary policy under an inﬂation-targeting regime such as the one the
Bank of Canada has been following over the past two decades. According to the Taylor
rule, the central bank adjusts the nominal interest rate, Rn
t , in response to deviations in
inﬂation, πt and Yt from their steady-state values, π, and Y . It is assumed that the central
bank smooths interest rates, adjusting them gradually to the desired value. This behaviour is
widely observed in practice and has been shown by Woodford (2003) to be a desirable outcome
in a model for optimizing private sector behaviour, because it can help to steer private sector


















where ϕπ, ϕY and ϕr are policy coeﬃcients chosen by the central bank, and εm
t is a monetary
policy shock, which follows
ε
m
t  i.i.d.N(0,σεm). (37)
7Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006) show that Γt is bounded below by 1 and has ﬁrst-order real consequences
for the stationary distribution of the endogenous variables if the steady-state inﬂation is positive.
102.6.2 Augmented Taylor rule
In the second policy regime we consider, the central bank follows a Taylor rule under which
it can also lean against the build-up of emerging ﬁnancial imbalances. More speciﬁcally, the
baseline policy rule is augmented to allow the policy interest rate to also react to deviations


























and cgt is the growth rate of nominal credit, cgss is the steady-state value of cgt and ϕc is the
policy coeﬃcient chosen by the central bank that captures the extent to which it responds to
deviations in credit growth.
We use deviations of credit growth from its steady state as the variable that triggers an
interest rate response from the central bank given that credit variables have been found to
provide useful leading indicators of asset prices busts (IMF (2009)). Indeed, large booms in
credit have often been precursors to ﬁnancial crises, including the most recent crisis.
2.6.3 Macroprudential regime with a standard Taylor rule
The third policy regime combines a macroprudential rule with a standard Taylor rule. In this
regime, it is assumed that policy-makers have both interest rates and the macroprudential
instrument at their disposal to stabilize the macroeconomy. We follow Kannan et al. (2009)













ρ,with τ(.) > 0,
and ρτ is the policy coeﬃcient chosen by the policy-makers, which may or may not be the
central bank. Thus, in our model, use of the macroprudential tool is triggered by signs of
emerging ﬁnancial imbalances (as proxied by deviations in credit growth from its steady-state
value) and is assumed to have a direct inﬂuence on the funding costs of ﬁrms (via the external
ﬁnance premium). For example, a period of excessive credit expansion would trigger use of
the macroprudential tool, leading to an increase in ﬁrms’ funding costs and a dampening of
11investment (and hence aggregate economic activity).
2.6.4 Macroprudential regime with the augmented Taylor rule
The ﬁnal policy regime combines the augmented Taylor rule with the macroprudential in-
strument. In this regime, it is assumed that policy-makers have both interest rates and the
macroprudential instrument at their disposal to stabilize the macroeconomy according to
equation (40). Moreover, it is assumed that the policy rate reacts to credit growth according
to equation (38).
3 Data and estimation strategy
We estimate the model using a Bayesian approach. We use data for the following ﬁve variables
in our estimation: output, investment, the nominal interest rate, inﬂation and the external
ﬁnance cost. Output is measured by real GDP excluding government expenditures.8 Invest-
ment is the sum of gross ﬁxed capital formation and investment in inventories. The nominal
interest rate used is the overnight rate. Core CPI is used for our measure of inﬂation.9 And
the real external ﬁnance cost is measured using an index of real Canadian corporate yields.10
All data series are quarterly and are for the Canadian economy over the period from 1997Q1
to 2009Q3. The output and investment series are expressed in per capita terms, and are are
logged and linearly detrended. The series for the nominal interest rate, inﬂation, and the real
external ﬁnance cost are demeaned.
As is standard when estimating DSGE models using a Bayesian approach, some parameters
are set prior to estimation, because the data does not contain suﬃcient information to estimate
them. Table 1 lists the parameters we calibrate and the values assigned. The discount factor
β is set to 0.99, which implies an annual steady-state real interest rate of 4%. The steady-
state depreciation rate, δ, is assigned a value of 0.025. The parameter representing the capital
share in the Cobb-Douglas production function, α, is set to one-third. The steady-state price
markup ε/(ε   1) is set to 1.2.11 We set γ = 1 so that the implied labour supply elasticity
is 1/γ = 1.12 The weight of leisure in the utility function, θ, is set to 5.75, implying that
8We exclude government expenditures in our measure of output because there is no government spending
in the model.
9Core CPI is total CPI excluding eight of the most volatile components as well as the eﬀect of changes in
indirect taxes on the remaining components. The Bank of Canada uses the core CPI as a guide to its policy
actions.
10We use the Canadian Corporate Index Yield to Maturity series from Merrill Lynch (series F0C0). Although
this series only starts in 1997, we use it because we believe it’s the best proxy available for the external ﬁnance
costs of Canadian ﬁrms.
11This value is consistent with Leung (2008) who ﬁnds that the mark-up for major Canadian industries is
1.346, whereas that for Canadian manufacturing industries is 1.15.
12Existing studies suggest that the individual elasticity of labour is about 0.1, while the aggregate elasticity
12households spend one-third of their time working. The survival rate of entrepreneurs, η, is
set at 0.9728, as in Bernanke et al. (1999); this implies that the average working life for
entrepreneurs is 36 quarters and also implies that the steady-state risk premium is 1.0177.
The steady-state inﬂation rate is set to π = 1.02 per year. Following King and Santor (2008),
the steady-state ratio of net worth to capital is set to 0.6.
Table 1: Parameter calibration
Parameters Deﬁnition Values
β Discount factor 0.99
δ Capital depreciation rate 0.025
α Capital share in production function 1/3
ε Intermediate-good elasticity of substitution 6
γ Inverse of labor supply elasticity 1
θ Weight on leisure in the utility function 5.75
η Survival rate of entrepreneurs 0.9728
π Gross steady-state inﬂation rate 1.005
n/k Steady-state ratio of net worth to capital 0.6
s Gross steady-state risk premium 1.0177
The remaining parameters are estimated using a Bayesian approach. The information on
the priors for these parameters is given in Table 2.13 We use previous studies to guide us in
establishing our priors. The elasticity of the external ﬁnance premium with respect to ﬁrm
leverage, χ, is set to have a gamma distribution with a mean of 0.05 (the value suggested by
Bernanke et al. (1999)). The rest of the priors are fairly standard. For the monetary policy
rule, we set the prior of the reaction on inﬂation, ϕπ, to have a gamma distribution with a
mean of 1.5 and a standard deviation of 0.1. The coeﬃcient of the reaction on the output gap,
ϕY, is assumed to have a normal distribution of mean 0.1 and a standard deviation of 0.05.
The interest rate smoothing parameter is assumed to have a Beta distribution of mean 0.85
and a standard deviation of 0.05. For the priors of the shocks aﬀecting the economy, we set
the autoregressive coeﬃcients of the technology shocks, investment-speciﬁc shocks, preference
and ﬁnancial shock to have a beta distribution with a mean of 0.80 and a standard deviation
of 0.05. The standard deviations of the innovations are assumed to follow an inverse-gamma
distribution with a mean of 0.01. Finally, the parameter ξ, which determines the degree
is about 0.9, with most of the diﬀerence due to the extensive margin (i.e., participation and employment).
See Fiorito and Zanella (2009) for more details.
13As the results can be sensitive to the prior distributions selected when using the Bayesian method, we
use loose priors whenever possible and aim to keep the priors on the stochastic processes as harmonized as
possible.
13of capital adjustment costs, is set to have a normal distribution with a mean of 0.25 and a
standard deviation of 0.05. The Calvo probability, ν, is assumed to be around 0.67, suggesting
an average length of price contract of three quarters.
Table 2: Estimation results
Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Coef. Density Mean StD Mode Mean 5% 95%
χ G 0.05 0.02 0.0594 0.0615 0.0339 0.0881
ξ N 0.25 0.05 0.2603 0.2608 0.1804 0.3363
ν B 0.67 0.05 0.4824 0.4819 0.4320 0.5288
ϕ G 1.50 0.10 1.7062 1.7256 1.5625 1.8762
ϕY N 0.10 0.05 0.0776 0.0771 0.0361 0.1126
ϕr B 0.85 0.05 0.7145 0.7057 0.6516 0.7667
ρf B 0.80 0.05 0.7980 0.7920 0.7251 0.8569
ρz B 0.80 0.05 0.8342 0.8347 0.7684 0.9002
ρx B 0.80 0.05 0.8810 0.8792 0.8355 0.9271
ρp B 0.80 0.05 0.9546 0.9512 0.9365 0.9656
σf IG 0.01 — 0.0018 0.0018 0.0015 0.0022
σz IG 0.01 — 0.0060 0.0065 0.0049 0.0079
σe IG 0.01 — 0.0021 0.0022 0.0018 0.0026
σx IG 0.01 — 0.0050 0.0052 0.0038 0.0065
σp IG 0.01 — 0.0211 0.0211 0.0171 0.0250
We use Dynare 3.065 to estimate the model. We use the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm
to perform the simulations. To check for convergence, we run two diﬀerence chains starting
from dispersed points. For each chain, the total number of draws is 20,000 and the ﬁrst 20%
of the draws are discarded. A step size of 0.5 resulted in an acceptance rate of 0.33.
4 Estimation results
4.1 Parameter estimates
Along with the priors, Table 2 also reports the parameter estimates, displaying the mode, the
mean, and the 5 and 95 percentiles of the posterior distribution of the parameters. In what
follows, we report the posterior modes, as they are very close to the posterior means. The
elasticity of the risk premium with respect to leverage, χ, is estimated to be around 6%. The
persistence of the ﬁnancial shock is 0.798 and the standard deviation is estimated at 0.0018.14
14Given the importance of the parameters related to ﬁnancial frictions and the ﬁnancial shock in our study,
it is useful to compare our estimates of these parameters to those from previous studies. Our estimate of χ
is close to the estimates (χ = 0.04) in Christensen and Dib (2008) and Covas and Zhang (2010). For the
ﬁnancial shock, we compare our estimates with those in Dib et al. (2008), a paper that also estimates a DSGE
model with a ﬁnancial shock for the Canada economy. The volatilities of the estimated ﬁnancial shock from
14Among the shocks, the preference shock is the most persistent and volatile.
Now turning to the other parameters. The estimated value of the monetary policy pa-
rameter, ϕπ, the coeﬃcient that captures the response of monetary policy to a deviation of
inﬂation from its steady state, is 1.7. The coeﬃcient that measures the response of monetary
policy to the output gap, ϕY, is 0.077. This estimate suggests that monetary policy does not
react very strongly to the output gap. The interest rate smoothing parameter is estimated at
0.71. The estimate of the capital adjustment cost, ξ, is 0.2603, which is close to the estimate
in Covas and Zhang (2010). The estimate of the sticky price parameter, ν, is 0.48, suggesting
that the average duration of price contracts is about two quarters.
4.2 The behaviour of the estimated model under the baseline pol-
icy regime
In this section, we use the estimated model with the baseline policy regime (i.e., the standard
Taylor with interest-rate smoothing) to analyze the eﬀects of key shocks in our model economy
using both impulse response functions (IRFs) and variance decomposition. This section is
intended to show that the performance of the estimated model in response to key shocks is
reasonable as well as to provide some intuition regarding the key mechanisms at play in the
model.
4.2.1 Impulse-response analysis
Figures 1 and 2 in Appendix A plot the IRFs of the estimated model for two key shocks:
a ﬁnancial shock and a technology shock. All impulse responses are for a temporary one
standard deviation shock. The ﬁnancial shock is modelled as a negative shock to the external
risk premium. It is a simple way to proxy for an expansionary ﬁnancial shock that could be
the result of, for example, a relaxation in lending standards. The technology shock is fairly
standard and is modelled as a positive shock to zt, the aggregate technology term in the
production function.
We ﬁrst consider the response of our estimated model economy to an expansionary ﬁnancial
shock. As shown in Figure 1, an expansionary ﬁnancial shock leads to a positive output gap,
a rise in inﬂation and an increase in credit growth. The intuition is as follows. The fall in the
risk premium leads to a decline in the external ﬁnance cost and an increase in the demand
for capital. This in turn leads to higher asset prices and higher net worth, leading to a higher
demand for credit. Hours increase as well since ﬁrms hire more labour, leading to the rise in
output.
our paper and Dib et al. (2008) are similar, although our results suggests the ﬁnancial shock is less persistent.
15Inﬂation also rises following the expansionary ﬁnancial shock due to an increase in marginal
cost, resulting from an increase in real wages and a fall in the marginal productivity of labour.
This is because marginal cost is determined by the ratio of the real wage Wt/Pt to the marginal
productivity of labour (1   Ω)FHt in the model. This can be seen by rewriting the following
equation:












Real wages rise following the ﬁnancial shock because the increase in hours pushes up the
marginal disutility of labour. The marginal productivity of labour decreases as hours worked
increase immediately whereas the capital stock adjust gradually, resulting in a decline in the
capital-labour ratio.
Figure 2 depicts the response of key variables in the model following a positive technology
shock. As shown, output, consumption, and investment all rise and inﬂation declines, which
is consistent with the responses in a standard New-Keynesian model. In terms of the response
of ﬁnancial variables, both asset prices and nominal credit growth increase as enterpreneurs
invest more and the demand for capital rises. Although the net worth of enterpreneurs’ rises,
the demand for capital increases even more, resulting in an increase in leverage, and in turn,
a higher risk premium.
4.2.2 Variance Decomposition
Table 3 shows the contribution of each of the shocks to the variability of the key variables in
the model. Our estimation results suggest that the preference shock is the most persistent
and the most volatile shock, and thus it is not surprising that the preference shock appears
to be the main source of the ﬂuctuations in output and consumption. The ﬁnancial shock is
the least persistent and the least volatile of the shocks considered, but it plays an important
role in explaining the variation in some key variables in the model due to the ﬁnancial accel-
erator eﬀects. In particular, the ﬁnancial shock accounts for 30 percent of the ﬂuctuations in
inﬂation, 60 percent of those in investment, 75 percent of those in the risk premium and 43
percent of variation in the policy rate. Technology and investment-speciﬁc shocks explain a
signiﬁcant amount of the variation in investment and output (i.e., 25 percent and 11 percent,
respectively). As expected, the monetary policy shock in an important driver of inﬂation,
accounting for 55 percent of its total variation.
16Table 3: Variance Decomposition
Technology Monetary Investment Preference Financial
Output 10.95 1.57 1.05 81.63 4.80
Inﬂation 6.09 55.30 4.91 2.84 30.87
Consumption 5.81 0.16 1.74 86.46 5.82
Investment 14.19 5.78 10.55 9.62 59.86
Policy Rate 13.98 0.25 8.46 33.33 43.97
Risk Premium 0.51 0.11 7.07 16.97 75.34
5 The Performance of Diﬀerent Policy Regimes in Re-
action to Key Shocks
In this section, we examine the behaviour of our estimated economy under the four diﬀerent
policy regimes discussed in Section 3 in response to the same two shocks discussed above: an
expansionary ﬁnancial shock and a positive technology shock.
5.1 Expansionary ﬁnancial shock
Figure 3 in Appendix B compares the responses of the key variables in our model economy
to an expansionary ﬁnancial shock under the four diﬀerent policy regimes considered. All of
the parameters in our baseline policy rule are estimated, as discussed in the previous section
(and shown in Table 2). For the augmented Taylor rule, we take the estimated parameters
from the standard Taylor rule for ϕr = 0.71, ϕπ = 1.7 and ϕy = 0.08 and we set ϕc = 0.5,
where ϕc is the policy coeﬃcient chosen by the central bank that captures the extent to which
it responds to deviations in credit growth.
Compared to the standard Taylor rule (solid blue line), the impact of the ﬁnancial shock
is dampened when the central bank follows a Taylor rule under which it also responds to
deviations in credit growth (solid red line). Output and inﬂation still rise in the latter policy
regime, but by less. The responses of the ﬁnancial variables are dampened as well, as nominal
credit growth, asset prices and net worth all rise by less. The dampened response works
through the expectation channel. In a regime where policy-makers respond to deviations in
credit conditions, agents expect the policy rate to react more aggressively in the presence of
an expansionary ﬁnancial shock than it would in the standard Taylor rule regime. Forward-
looking agents take the potential rise in the policy interest rate (and the associate rise in the
cost of external ﬁnance) into account and hence reduce their borrowing accordingly. This
dampens the responses in output and inﬂation, and the ex post policy rate rises by less com-
pared to the standard Taylor rule. Thus, in response to a ﬁnancial shock, our results suggest
17that a policy regime in which the central bank responds to deviations in credit conditions
would result in less volatility in both inﬂation and ﬁnancial market conditions compared to
the standard Taylor rule.
Inﬂation and output are further stabilized in response to a ﬁnancial shock under the
regime that combines a standard Taylor rule with a macroprudential tool (ρτ = 0.5, dashed
blue line). Under this regime, policy-makers have the macroprudential instrument at their
disposal and can use it to directly oﬀset the eﬀects of the expansionary ﬁnancial shock on
the external ﬁnance premium. Thus, following an expansionary ﬁnancial shock, the external
risk premium does decline, as in the Taylor rule regime, but by less because policymakers use
the countercyclical macroprudential instrument to partially oﬀset the fall in the external risk
premium. This smaller decline in the external risk premium results in more muted increases
in investment and credit demand. This, in turn, dampens the response in inﬂation and output
and the ex post policy rate rises by less compared to the standard Taylor rule. The responses
of inﬂation and output are also more muted under the macroprudential regime compared to
the augmented Taylor rule regime, as policymakers have at their disposal a macroprudential
tool that directly inﬂuences the risk premium in the latter regime whereas in the augmented
Taylor rule regime, monetary policy inﬂuences the risk premium indirectly via the expectation
channel.
In the fourth regime considered, policy-makers have two instruments at their disposal
to oﬀset the eﬀects of ﬁnancial imbalances: the policy rate and the macroprudential tool
(ϕc = 0.5,, ρτ = 0.5). In the presence of a ﬁnancial shock, the macroprudential regime with
an augmented Taylor rule (dashed red line) oﬀers similar beneﬁts in terms of macroeconomic
stabilization as does the regime that combines a standard Taylor rule with the macropru-
dential instrument. Indeed, the responses of the key variables are similar under the two
macroprudential regimes, suggesting that the macroprudential instrument may be a more
eﬀective tool for macroeconomic stabilization in the presence of a ﬁnancial shock than the
policy rate.
5.2 Positive technology shock
As made clear in the previous section, macroeconomic stabilization is better served in the
presence of a ﬁnancial shock under regimes where policy-makers respond to ﬁnancial im-
balances (using either the policy rate and/or a macroprudential instrument) compared to a
standard Taylor rule regime. However, this result may not hold in the face of other types of
shocks. To examine this issue, we now compare how the economy would respond to a positive
technology shock under the diﬀerent policy regimes considered.
18Figure 4 in Appendix B compares the responses of the key variables in our model economy
to a positive technology shock under the four diﬀerent policy regimes considered. In contrast
to the case of a ﬁnancial shock, the responses of inﬂation and output are fairly similar across
the four regimes. Thus, all four regimes yields similar results in terms of macroeconomic
stabilization. However, the means by which this result are achieved diﬀer across the regimes.
In the standard Taylor rule regime (blue line), the central bank eases monetary policy in
response to the fall in inﬂation resulting from the positive technology shock and hence the
policy rate declines. Under the augmented Taylor rule regime (red line), the policy rate also
falls but the decline is larger on impact because agents expect the central bank to increase
the policy rate in response to the increase in credit growth resulting from the technology
shock. Thus, the required response in the policy rate following a technology shock is larger
when the central bank also responds to deviations in credit conditions compared to the case
where it follows a standard Taylor rule. Under the two macroprudential regimes (dashed
red and blue lines), policy-makers will use the macroprudential tool to oﬀset the eﬀects of
rising credit growth that arise following the positive technology shock and this will lead to an
increase in the risk premium, which will counteract to some extent the eﬀects of the easing
in monetary policy. Thus, monetary policy will have to be eased further and the policy rate
will need to decline by more in the regimes that feature the macroprudential tool compared
to the standard Taylor rule regime.
5.3 Interest-rate smoothing
Our baseline policy rule is a standard Taylor rule where it is assumed that the central bank
smooths the policy rate, as is widely observed in practice. Appendix C depicts the key results
for the various policy regimes considered in the case where it is assumed that the central bank
follows a standard Taylor rule without smoothing the interest rate. As shown, the results do
not change in a material way. There are only minor diﬀerences in the estimated parameters for
the smoothing and non-smoothing cases (Table 12). The results of the variance decomposition
reveal that the preference shock plays a less dominant role in explaining variation in output
and consumption when the central banks doesn’t smooth the interest rate. Indeed, as shown in
Table 13, although the preference shock continues to be the main source of the ﬂuctuations in
output and consumption, it explains relatively less of the variation in these variables compared
to the smoothing case and technology shocks explain relatively more. Preference shocks also
explain less of the variation in the policy rate, although they explain more of the variation
in inﬂation and the risk premium in the non-smoothing case. Moreover, the key variables
in the model respond to shocks in a similar fashion in the smoothing and non-smoothing
cases. However, in the presence of an expansionary ﬁnancial shock, the responses of the key
19variables are generally more muted when the central bank does not smooth the interest rate,
whereas in the presence of a technology shock, it is mainly the response of inﬂation that is
more muted.
6 Welfare Analysis
In this section, we compare the performance of our four policy regimes using a welfare cri-
terion. In conducting our welfare analysis, we assume that the behavioural parameters and
the parameters governing the exogenous shocks are the same across all regimes. The values
for the estimated parameters are taken from the mode estimates reported in Table 2. In each











In order words, the optimal policy coeﬃcients in each regime are those that yield the paths
for consumption and hours worked that achieve the highest level of unconditional lifetime
utility.15 The change in welfare associated with a particular policy regime is captured by
the compensating variation, which measures the percentage change in consumption in the
deterministic steady-state that would give households the same unconditional expected utility
in the stochastic economy. Therefore, a negative ﬁgure indicates a welfare cost and a positive
ﬁgure indicates a welfare gain, and the gain of the alternative regimes over the standard
Taylor regime is the percentage diﬀerence between the two regimes.16
Table 4 reports the optimal policy coeﬃcients in each regime, and Table 5 reports the
welfare costs associated with the optimal policy in each regime as well as the welfare gain
of each regime over the standard Taylor rule regime. The results in these tables suggest
that it is welfare-improving for policy-makers to respond to ﬁnancial imbalances. In fact,
welfare is highest in the regime where policy-makers respond to ﬁnancial imbalances using
both the policy rate and the macroprudential tool (i.e., the macroprudential regime with the
15For the optimal rule coeﬃcients, we perform a grid search for ϕ, ϕY , ϕc and ρ (keeping ϕr ﬁxed at
0.71). To ensure the local uniqueness of the rational expectation equilibrium, we limit our attention to policy
coeﬃcients in the interval (1, 3] for ϕ and in the interval [0, 0.5] for ϕY . In the former case, we follow
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) in setting the upper bound to 3 given that a policy parameter larger than
3 would be diﬃcult to communicate to the public. For parameters ϕc and ρ, we restrict them to be within
the interval [0,1]. We set the size of the intervals for all the coeﬃcients to 0.1.
16For example, as shown in Table 5, under the standard Taylor rule regime, the welfare in utils is -73.0897,
which corresponds to a welfare cost (relative to the deterministic economy) of 0.0906% of steady-state con-
sumption. Under the augmented Taylor rule regime, the corresponding values for welfare and welfare cost
are -73.0855 and -0.0864% of steady-state consumption, respectively. Thus, the gain associated with the aug-
mented Taylor rule regime (relative to the baseline regime) is 0.0042% (i.e., -0.0864 - (-0.0906)) of steady-state
consumption.
20augmented Taylor rule). We provide intuition for this key result below.
Table 4: Optimal Rules Under Diﬀerent Regimes
Optimal coeﬃcients
ϕπ ϕY ϕc ρτ
Standard Taylor regime 3 0.1 - -
Augmented regime 3 0.1 1 -
Macroprudential regime 3 0.1 - 1
Augmented Macroprudential regime 3 0.1 0.9 1
Note: We keep ϕr ﬁxed at 0.71.
Table 5: Welfare Comparison across Diﬀerent Regimes
Welfare Welfare cost Relative gain
Standard Taylor regime -73.0897 -0.0906 -
Augmented regime -73.0855 -0.0864 0.0042
Macroprudential regime -73.0836 -0.0845 0.0061
Augmented Macroprudential regime -73.0830 -0.0839 0.0067
Notes: (1) Welfare is measured in utils. (2) The welfare cost is measured in terms of
steady-state consumption (in percentage) and relative to the deterministic economy.
(3) The welfare gain is relative to the standard Taylor rule regime.
6.1 Macroprudential regime with standard Taylor rule
The results in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that it is optimal for policy-makers to use the macropru-
dential tool and that the welfare gain associated with this regime, compared to the standard
Taylor rule, is about 0.0061% of steady-state consumption. To provide intuition for this re-
sult, we also compute the optimal monetary policies assuming the economy is only subject to
a ﬁnancial shock or a technology shock. This exercise is useful given that the performance of
the diﬀerent policy regimes in reaction to the two keys shocks diﬀers, as discussed in Section
6.
As shown in Table 6, in an economy where the ﬁnancial shock is the only shock buﬀeting
the economy, it is optimal for policymakers to use the macroprudential tool agressively (i.e.,
ρτ = 1); the associated welfare gain, compared to the standard Taylor rule regime, is about
0.0048% of steady-state consumption. The welfare gain arises because the macroprudential
tool signiﬁcantly reduces the volatility in the key macro variables in the presence of a ﬁnancial
shock. As discussed in Section 6, following an expansionary ﬁnancial shock, the external
21Table 6: Optimal Rules and Welfare Gains Under Macroprudential Regimes
ϕπ ϕY ϕc ρτ Welfare Relative gain
All shocks 3 0.1 - 1 -73.0836 0.0061
3 0.1 - - -73.0897 -
Financial shock only 3 0.2 - 1 -72.9999 0.0048
3 0.5 - - -73.0047 -
Technology shock only 3 0 - 0.1 -72.9963 4.84313E-05
3 0 - - -72.9964 -
Thought experiment
Technology shock only 3 0.2 - 1 -72.9974 -0.0010
3 0 - - -72.9964 -
Notes: (1) See notes for Table 5. (2) The numbers in italics correspond
to the standard Taylor rule regime.
risk premium declines, leading to higher demand for credit and investment. Both inﬂation
and output rise, calling for tighter monetary policy. A countercyclical macroprudential tool
increases the external risk premium, leading to a dampening in investment and credit demand.
This stabilization eﬀect increases welfare. However, this aggressive use of the macroprudential
tool is not optimal when other shocks buﬀet the economy. As shown in Table 6, in the presence
of a technology shock, the optimal coeﬃcient on the macroprudential tool becomes very small.
In fact, aggressive use of the macroprudential tool will reduce welfare if the economy is
only subject to a technology shock. This result is shown in the last row of Table 6. In this
thought experiment, we assume that the economy is only subject to a technology shock but
that policy-makers adopt the policy rule that is optimal in the presence of a ﬁnancial shock,
which involves an aggressive use of the macroprudential tool. Welfare decreases under this
rule. The intuition is as follows. Following a positive technology shock, output and credit rise
but inﬂation declines. This creates a tension between two instruments, the policy rate and the
macroprudential tool. The policy rate needs to decline to bring inﬂation back to target. How-
ever, the rise in nominal credit growth calls for a tightening in the macroprudential tool (i.e.,
a rise in the risk premium), which reduces the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy. In this case,
monetary policy has to be eased further to compensate for the eﬀect of the macroprudential
tool, leading to higher volatility in the policy rate and inﬂation, which reduces welfare.
6.2 Augmented Taylor rule regime
As the results in Tables 4 and 5 suggest, it is optimal for monetary policy to respond to ﬁnan-
cial imbalances and the welfare gain associated with the augmented Taylor rule, compared
22to the standard Taylor rule, is about 0.0042% of steady-state consumption. To understand
the source of this welfare gain, we conduct similar experiments for the augmented Taylor rule
regime as we did for the macroprudential regime. The results are presented in Table 7.
Table 7: Optimal Rules and Welfare Gains Under Augmented Regimes
ϕπ ϕY ϕc Welfare Relative gain
All shocks 3 0.1 1 -73.0855 0.0042
3 0.1 - -73.0897 -
Financial shock only 3 0.3 1 -73.0026 0.0021
3 0.5 - -73.0047 -
Technology shock only 3 0 0.1 -72.9964 1.62004E-06
3 0 - -72.9964 -
Thought experiment
Technology shock only 3 0.3 1 -72.9985 -0.0021
3 0 - -72.9964 -
Notes: See notes for Table 6.
Table 7 suggests that if the ﬁnancial shock is the only shock buﬀeting the economy, it
is optimal for the central bank to react aggressively to deviations in nominal credit growth
(i.e., ϕc = 1). As suggested in Section 6, this is due to the expectation channel. Following an
expansionary ﬁnancial shock, under the augmented Taylor rule, agents expect the policy rate
to react more aggressively than they would if the central bank followed a standard Taylor rule.
Agents take these potential rises in the interest rate and external ﬁnance cost into account,
and reduce borrowing accordingly. This dampens the responses in output and inﬂation,
leading the ex post policy rate to rise by less compared to the standard Taylor rule. Thus,
under the augmented Taylor rule, the volatility of the key variables is reduced in the presence
of a ﬁnancial shock and this improves welfare. However, this result may not generalize to
other types of shocks. As suggested in Section 6, the volatility in the policy rate increases
in the presence of a technology shock if the central bank responds aggressively to deviations
in credit growth. As shown in the last row of Table 7, in an economy that is buﬀeted only
with a technology shock, an aggressive response to deviations in credit growth (that would
be appropriate for an economy facing only a ﬁnancial shock) will lead to a decline in welfare.
It is worth noting that the welfare gain associated with the augmented Taylor rule regime
is not as large as that associated with the macroprudential regime (i.e., 0.0042 versus 0.0061).
The larger welfare gain in the latter regime is due to the fact that the macroprudential tool
works directly on the source of the ﬁnancial imbalance as opposed to addressing it indirectly
via the expectation channel.
236.3 Macroprudential regime with augmented Taylor rule
As shown in Table 8, when policy-makers have both the policy rate and the macroprudential
tool at their disposal to stabilize the macroeconomy, it is optimal for them to use both
instruments. Compared to the standard Taylor rule, the welfare gain is the highest under
the macroprudential regime with the augmented Taylor rule, representing about 0.0067%
of steady-state consumption. The results also suggest that once policy-makers adopt the
macroprudential tool, the policy rate will react to deviations in credit growth less aggressively
(i.e., ϕc = 0.9 compared to ϕc = 1 for all shocks in the augmented regime; and ϕc = 0.6
compared to ϕc = 1 for the ﬁnancial shock in the augmented regime).
Table 8: Optimal Rules and Welfare Gains Under Augmented Macroprudential Regimes
ϕπ ϕY ϕc ρτ Welfare Relative gain
All shocks 3 0.1 0.9 1 -73.0830 0.0067
3 0.1 - - -73.0897 -
Financial shock only 3 0 0.6 1 -72.9997 0.0049
3 0.5 - - -73.0047 -
Technology shock only 3 0 0 0.1 -72.9963 4.84313E-05
3 0 - - -72.9964 -
Notes: See notes for Table 6.
6.4 Price-level targeting
We also consider whether policy-makers should respond to ﬁnancial imbalances in a price-
level targeting (PLT) regime. The PLT regime is deﬁned as follows. It is assumed that, by
targeting the price level, the central bank adjusts the nominal interest rate, Rn
t , in response
to deviations of the price level, Pt, from the targeted price level, Pt, and deviations of output


















where Pt = πtP0, and P0 = 1.
Table 9 presents the optimal policy rules for the diﬀerent regimes considered for the case of
PLT as well as a welfare comparison between IT and PLT. The results suggest that it is optimal
for policymakers to respond to ﬁnancial imbalances by using either the policy rate and/or the
macroprudential tool under a PLT regime as was the case under an IT regime. Consistent
24Table 9: Optimal Coeﬃcients and Welfare Under Diﬀerent Regimes: PLT
Optimal coeﬃcients Welfare cost Relative gain
ϕP ϕY ϕc ρτ
Standard Taylor-type regime 3 0.5 - - -0.0555 0.0351
(-0.0906)
Augmented regime 3 0.5 0.5 - -0.0553 0.0311
(-0.0864)
Macroprudential regime 3 0.5 - 0.3 -0.0550 0.0295
(-0.0845)
Macroprudential augmented regime 3 0.5 0.6 0.3 -0.0548 0.0291
(-0.0839)
Notes: (1) See notes from Table 5. (2) The welfare gain is relative to the corresponding IT
regime (shown in parenthesis).
with previous work, we found a welfare gain of PLT over IT across all the regimes. The
welfare gain arises due to the history dependence feature in PLT. History dependence refers
to the expectation that future deﬂation (inﬂation) will immediately depress (spur) inﬂation
when shocks buﬀet the economy. Introducing history dependence in a forward-looking model
stabilizes expectations and delivers lower macroeconomic variability and higher welfare. In
general, key macroeconomic variables are less volatile under a PLT regime, compared to an
IT regime.
Table 10 quantiﬁes the welfare gain of the diﬀerent regimes over the standard Taylor type
regime under PLT. As shown, both the augmented Taylor rule regime and the macroprudential
regime outperform the standard Taylor rule in a PLT regime. However, compared to IT, the
gains are smaller. For example, under IT, the welfare gain associated with the macropudential
regime over the standard Taylor rule is about 0.0061% of steady-state consumption. While
under PLT, the corresponding gain is just about 0.0005% of steady-state consumption. Under
IT, the welfare gain associated with the augmented Taylor rule, over the standard Taylor rule,
is about 0.0042% of steady-state consumption. Under PLT, the corresponding gain is about
0.0002% of steady-state consumption. The smaller welfare gain arises because under PLT, the
volatility of the key macro variables is already low when the central bank follows a standard
Taylor-type rule due to the beneﬁts of history dependence. Therefore, the beneﬁts of further
stabilization by adopting a policy regime where policy-makers respond to ﬁnancial imbalances,
using the policy rate and/or the macroprudential tool, is marginal.
25Table 10: Welfare Comparison Across Diﬀerent Regimes: PLT
Welfare cost Gain relative to
standard Taylor rule





Macroprudential augmented -0.0548 0.0007
(0.0067)
Notes: (1) See notes for Table 9. (2) The relative gains over the standard Taylor rule for IT regimes
are shown in parenthesis.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies whether it is optimal for policy-makers to respond to ﬁnancial imbalances
in the context of a model, estimated on Canadian data, that features both ﬁnancial frictions
and ﬁnancial shocks. Our ﬁndings suggest that welfare is higher, compared to a standard
Taylor rule, in regimes where policy-makers respond to ﬁnancial imbalances using the policy
rate and/or a macroprudential tool. The welfare gain arises due to the beneﬁts that such
regimes oﬀer for macroeconomic stabilization, particularly in the presence of ﬁnancial shocks.
Although the performance of the diﬀerent regimes varies depending on the types of shocks that
hit the economy, our results suggest that the beneﬁts of responding to ﬁnancial imbalances
in the presence of all shocks outweigh the costs.
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28Appendix A: Impulse-Response Functions for the Esti-
mated Model under the Baseline Policy
Regime




















































































































































29Appendix B: The Performance of Diﬀerent Policy Regimes
in Response to Key Shocks
























































































































































30Appendix C: Key Results for the Non-Smoothing Case
Table 11: Estimation results: Non-smoothing case
Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Coef. Density Mean StD Mode Mean 5% 95%
χ G 0.05 0.02 0.059 0.063 0.031 0.090
ξ N 0.25 0.05 0.252 0.248 0.171 0.331
ν B 0.67 0.05 0.461 0.462 0.417 0.509
ϕ G 1.50 0.10 1.818 1.829 1.668 1.985
ϕY N 0.10 0.05 0.057 0.049 0.008 0.085
ρf B 0.80 0.05 0.822 0.809 0.735 0.883
ρz B 0.80 0.05 0.857 0.863 0.792 0.934
ρx B 0.80 0.05 0.886 0.885 0.840 0.930
ρp B 0.80 0.05 0.946 0.934 0.897 0.963
σf IG 0.01 — 0.0014 0.0015 0.0012 0.0017
σz IG 0.01 — 0.0079 0.0087 0.0064 0.0109
σe IG 0.01 — 0.0056 0.0058 0.0048 0.0068
σx IG 0.01 — 0.0057 0.0053 0.0039 0.0066
σp IG 0.01 — 0.0188 0.0179 0.0121 0.0227
Table 12: Variance Decomposition: Non-smoothing case
technology monetary investment preference ﬁnancial
output 30.67 0.91 1.08 64.55 2.78
inﬂation 10.44 59.40 4.87 5.50 19.79
consumption 17.26 0.09 2.37 74.46 5.82
investment 34.90 3.20 10.73 10.73 40.44
policy rate 11.03 0.07 11.58 29.75 47.57
risk premium 1.33 0.07 11.22 19.36 68.03















































































32Figure 6: Eﬀects of a Positive Technology Shock (non-smoothing case)
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